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Human Rights Courts and Global Constitutionalism: 






International courts regularly cite each other, in part as a means of building legitimacy. Such 
international, cross-court use of precedent (or “judicial dialogue”) among the regional human rights 
courts and the Human Rights Committee has an additional purpose and effect: the construction of a 
rights-based global constitutionalism. Judicial dialogue among the human rights courts is 
purposeful in that the courts see themselves as embedded in, and contributing to, a global human 
rights legal system. Cross-citation among the human rights courts advances the construction of 
rights-based global constitutionalism in that it provides a basic degree of coordination among the 
regional courts. The jurisprudence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), as an authoritative 
interpreter of core international human rights norms, plays the role of a central focal point for the 
decentralized coordination of jurisprudence. The network of regional courts and the HRC is building 
an emergent institutional structure for global rights-based constitutionalism. 
  
                                                        
* Fellow at the Berlin Potsdam Research Group “International Law – Rise or Decline?”, Professor of 
International Relations and Law, University of Southern California. 
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International courts regularly cite each other, even though a formal doctrine of precedent does not 
exist in international law. For instance, the regional human rights courts refer to each other’s case 
law, in part as a tool for building legitimacy (Sandholtz and Feldman 2019). This study aims to show 
that judicial dialogue among the regional human rights courts and the Human Rights Committee 
has an additional purpose and effect: the construction of a rights-based global constitutionalism. 
Judicial dialogue among the human rights courts is purposeful in that they see themselves as 
embedded in, and contributing to, a global human rights legal system. Cross-citation among the 
human rights courts advances the construction of rights-based global constitutionalism in that it 
provides a basic degree of coordination among the regional courts and the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC). Though the jurisprudence of the human rights courts necessarily responds to the 
human rights problems and the political contexts in their respective regions, the sharing of 
precedent means that fundamental norms and principles develop in common across regions. In 
this sense, judicial dialogue among the human rights courts contributes to strengthening the 
international rule of law. 
The following section builds on theories of global constitutionalism. Two core elements of global 
constitutionalism are a normative structure (rules) and an institutional structure to interpret and 
apply the rules. I will argue that the web of international and regional human rights treaties 
constitutes the normative structure of global constitutionalism. But the central argument of this 
study is that the regional human rights courts and the HRC are constructing, in rudimentary form, 
the institutional component of global rights-based constitutionalism. The following section 
provides the empirical support for that argument, documenting the network of cross-citations 
among the regional human rights courts, and from the regional courts to the HRC. 
A brief clarification of the term “global” in this context is in order. I argue that the network of 
human rights courts is building the emergent institutional dimension of a global constitutionalism, 
but significant parts of the world, including Asia and the Middle East, do not participate in regional 
human rights courts. I argue that the term “global” applies nevertheless. First, the informal 
coordination among the human rights courts and the HRC is creating shared interpretations of 
universal human rights norms and principles. Those interpretations establish baselines, or focal 
points, that can guide actors in parts of the world that are not covered by a regional human rights 
court, as they seek to invoke, assert, or apply international human rights norms. Second, though no 
regional human rights court has jurisdiction in countries of Asia and the Middle East, the Human 
Rights Committee possesses a global mandate. It is not a court, and its conclusions and general 
comments are not legally binding. But it is an authoritative interpreter of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is by now global. The ICCPR is global in that (1) 
it has nearly universal ratification and (2) many of its human rights norms have clearly achieved the 
status of customary international law (for example, the prohibition on torture). The HRC acts as a 
point of reference for the interpretation and application of global human rights norms. Finally, I 
describe the network of courts and the HRC as building an emergent, decentralized institutional 
structure for global rights-based constitutionalism.  
2. Modern constitutionalism 
Though diverse approaches to the idea of “global constitutionalism” exist, they all assert that 
certain international law principles and norms serve functions at the global level akin to (though 
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not identical to) the role played by constitutions in domestic legal orders. Political scientists, with 
some exceptions, have paid little attention to the scholarly work on global constitutionalism, 
perhaps supposing that it is a purely theoretical exercise without relevance for empirical 
outcomes. This study starts from the contrary premise: that a properly specified conception of 
global constitutionalism offers a useful framework for understanding the development of the 
international human rights regime.  
The discussion here is not about constitutions, if by “constitution” we mean a document, 
established by a constituent act, that creates the institutions of government, defines their powers, 
and establishes rules for the production, interpretation, and enforcement of additional laws. 
Rather, the argument is about constitutional orders, that is, systems of law and their associated 
institutions that perform functions that are “constitutional.” I argue that the international human 
rights regime, comprised of national, regional, and international layers, is such a constitutional 
order. 
Traditional conceptions of constitutionalism have been shaped by the domestic model. In the 
domestic model, constitutional meta-norms establish the institutions of the state and allocate 
functions and powers to those institutions. These meta-norms specify procedures for “how legal 
norms are to be produced, applied, and interpreted” (Stone 1994, 444), including rules for how 
constitutional rules themselves can be modified. Domestic constitutionalism also grounds the 
legitimacy of the constitutional order in the will of the people, who establish constitutional rules 
through a democratic act. As Kumm points out, international law constitutionalism differs from 
traditional domestic constitutionalism in that it does not establish a supreme authority, is not 
supported by the coercive apparatus of a state, and is not grounded in “the self-governing 
practices of a people” (Kumm 2009, 260).  
Modern constitutionalism, in contrast, sheds the statist features of constitutional theory. In 
traditional domestic versions of constitutionalism, the primacy of constitutional rules is justified in 
terms of an authoritative democratic will, that of the people, or of their delegates, or of the 
founders of the democratic constitutional order. The traditional version, however, can 
accommodate democratic repression, that is, the possibility (and the historical reality) that the will 
of the majority can support evils like apartheid and genocide. Modern constitutions, especially 
since World War II, thus build not just on the will of a people but on the freedom and rights of each 
person. The laws and policies – and all official deeds – enacted under the constitution must 
conform to higher-order norms that protect the freedom and dignity of each person by 
establishing rights. Thus modern constitutionalism is not just about institutional structures and 
procedures; it incorporates substantive norms on individual rights and freedoms. Rights place 
limits on the powers of all public officials. Kumm’s theory of cosmopolitan constitutionalism 
includes both the structural/procedural dimension and the substantive dimension. The latter 
consists of human rights: “a universal moral requirement that public authorities treat those who 
are subject to their authority as free and equal persons endowed with human dignity” (Kumm 2009, 
303). Gardbaum advances a cognate argument, that constitutional law is no longer just “law 
containing one or more metarules for the organization and ordering of political authority,” but 
defines a “legal system for the protecting of fundamental rights” (Gardbaum 2009, 238). Gardbaum 
also notes that this kind of constitutionalism “is no longer in practice, and so cannot be 
conceptualized as, limited to the national” (Ibid.). Stone Sweet similarly holds that the core of any 
modern constitutional order consists of a set of peremptory norms and “other substantive 
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fundamental rights,” plus “standards of procedural due process, and access to justice” (Stone 
Sweet 2013, 493). That “code of rights” is the “overarching normative structure” that makes a legal 
system constitutional (Ibid.). For Stone Sweet, too, modern constitutionalism informs both national 
and some international legal orders (Stone Sweet and Ryan Forthcoming). 
Modern constitutionalism is thus cosmopolitan and pluralist. It is cosmopolitan in that it is not 
grounded in the sovereign state or its people but in universal rights norms and principles (Kumm 
2009; Stone Sweet and Ryan Forthcoming). Modern constitutionalism is pluralist because it 
necessarily recognizes that separate constitutional orders coexist and interact. Multiple legal 
orders – domestic, regional, and international – possess an “autonomous claim to legitimacy” and 
authority (Stone Sweet 2013, 493). The key is that these multiple legal orders are not detached from 
each other: they overlap and interact. An early, and now archetypal, example of constitutional 
pluralism is the European Union (EU). It has long been recognized that with the doctrines of the 
supremacy and direct effect of EU law, coupled with judicial review by the ECJ, the EU became a 
constitutional system (Weiler 1991; Weiler 1999; MacCormick 1999; Stone Sweet 2004). Walker distills 
the essence of constitutional pluralism in the EU: “Constitutional pluralism, by contrast, recognises 
that the European order inaugurated by the Treaty of Rome has developed beyond the traditional 
confines of inter-national law and now makes its own independent constitutional claims, and that 
these claims exist alongside the continuing claims of states. The relationship between the orders, 
that is to say, is now horizontal rather than vertical – heterarchical rather than hierarchical” 
(Walker 2002, 337; see also Walker 2003). The European system of rights protection is likewise an 
example of constitutional pluralism, in which national courts and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) engage in “constitutional dialogues” so as to manage the interdependence of 
domestic and regional protection of rights and to promote “doctrinal coherence” (Stone Sweet and 
Ryan Forthcoming, chap. 3). Gardbaum regards both the EU and the European human rights regime 
(centered on the European Convention on Human Rights) as constitutionalized systems (Gardbaum 
2008, 760). Kumm argues that constitutional pluralism – better than traditional conceptions of 
monism and dualism – captures the “relationship between national and international law” (Kumm 
2009, 273). 
3. Global constitutionalism and human rights 
In the previous section I mentioned two elements of constitutional arrangements, the institutional 
and the substantive (normative content). In this section I offer conceptions of both dimensions in 
the context of global constitutionalism. The structural component of constitutionalism corresponds 
with Hart’s secondary rules (Hart 1994). These are “higher-order legal rules and principles that 
specify how all other lower-order legal norms are to be produced, applied, enforced, and 
interpreted. . . . They establish governmental institutions . . . and establish law-making procedures” 
(Stone Sweet 2009, 626). In minimalist (statist) perspectives on constitutionalism, this is all that 
constitutions do, but in modern constitutionalism a second component comes into play: 
substantive human rights norms and judicial mechanisms authorized to apply them.  
A system of constitutional justice – at any level – incorporates two key elements: a “charter of 
fundamental rights” and “a mode of constitutional review to protect those rights” (Stone Sweet 
2012, 816; Stone Sweet and Palmer 2017, 394). Constitutional rights create “justiciable obligations” 
on the part of public officials to respect rights, which in turn requires a judicial mechanism to 
review official acts for their compatibility with basic rights. Courts empowered to exercise rights-
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based review act as “trustees” of the constitutional system (Stone Sweet and Palmer 2017, 379).1 
This new constitutionalism took root in Europe after World War II and by the 1990s had “diffused 
globally” (Stone Sweet 2012, 816; Stone Sweet 2000). It is a “cosmopolitan constitutionalism” in 
which rights are interpreted not by applying some version of an authoritative will, whether that of 
the system’s founders or of a legislature, but through “public reason,” based on rights and judicial 
rights review (Kumm 2009).  
Constitutionalism in this sense is visible in an interconnected system linking national, regional, and 
international orders. The normative dimension is largely in place, as human rights are by now 
embedded in most national constitutions, in the regional human rights conventions, and in the 
network of international human rights treaties. These three sources of norms (constitutions, 
regional conventions, international treaties) contain overlapping, broadly similar lists of rights. The 
institutional dimension – courts with rights-review jurisdiction – exists in many states and in the 
regional human rights systems. In this section I describe these relatively well-established 
components of global constitutionalism. In a subsequent section, I advance the claim that the final 
piece – an international system of judicial rights review – exists in rudimentary, decentralized form, 
in the network of regional human rights courts and the Human Rights Committee.  
a) Human rights law: the international level 
International human rights norms provide the normative structure of global constitutionalism. The 
argument here builds on important insights advanced by Gardbaum and others. Gardbaum views 
the international human rights system as a stage “in the historical development of the idea of 
constitutionalism” (Gardbaum 2009, 255). In the first stage of constitutionalist thought, the will of 
the sovereign is law, but sovereignty resides in the people and is delegated to their representatives 
in government. The second stage sees the creation of domestic legal limits on state power. In the 
third stage, which Gardbaum labels “global constitutionalism,” “legal limits [on state power] are 
now imposed by international law and may also be interpreted and applied by — or in the shadow 
of — international rather than domestic state actors” (Gardbaum 2009, 255). Furthermore, the 
international human rights system embodies global constitutionalism by affirming that human 
rights norms apply to all people “as rights of human beings rather than as rights of citizens” 
(Gardbaum 2009, 257). The rights of citizens derive from domestic constitutions, whereas the rights 
of human beings are grounded in universal (cosmopolitan) norms. International human rights law 
thus reinforces one of the core purposes of modern constitutionalism: to set limits on “what 
governments can lawfully do to people within their jurisdictions” (Gardbaum 2009, 237). In that 
sense, international human rights law and national constitutional rights are functionally 
equivalent: they both set boundaries for the exercise of state authority. 
The story of the emergence and expansion of the international human rights regime is well known. 
The U.N. General Assembly approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, 
enumerating a list of civil, political, and due process rights. The Genocide Convention was signed 
the same year. Proponents of the UDHR had hoped that it would quickly be transformed into a 
comprehensive treaty, but the treaty-making process turned out to be a protracted one. The two 
covenants – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
                                                        
1 Gardbaum argues that a third model of constitutionalism has emerged in a few common-law states, one that 
stakes out a middle position between parliamentary supremacy and the new constitutionalism, granting less 
power to courts for constitutional rights review. See Gardbaum (2001; 2010). 
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Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – were signed in 1966 (as was the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)) but did not enter into 
effect until 1976. The UDHR and the two Covenants embody the core rights of the international 
human rights legal regime. Subsequent treaties for the most part affirmed Covenant rights, 
elaborated rights and obligations with greater specificity (torture, disappearances), or applied 
them to special populations (like women, children, persons with disabilities, or migrant workers). 
Figure 1 depicts the growth of the human rights regime in terms of the number of treaties and the 
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As Table 1 shows, some of the core human rights treaties have achieved virtually universal state 
participation and others, including the two Covenants, have reached very high levels of ratification 
or accession (87 percent of states for the ICCPR and 85 percent for the ICESCR). 
 












Note: "Ratification" includes accession and 
succession. Total UN membership in 2015 was 193 
states. Some entities that are not UN member states 
are registered as parties to some of the treaties. For 
example, both the Holy See and the State of 
Palestine are listed as parties to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC).  
 
What the international level is generally seen as lacking is the second component of modern 
constitutionalism: a judicial mechanism for rights review. Gardbaum recognizes the “tremendous 
growth” in the number of national courts exercising the power of rights review, but also notes that 
“international human rights courts with similar powers remain the exception rather than the rule, 
especially at the global level” (Gardbaum 2008, 751). A subsequent section discusses a potential 
framework for such a function at the international level. 
b) Human rights law: the regional level 
Regional human rights regimes developed in parallel with the global human rights system. The first 
of these emerged in Western Europe.  
aa) The European system 
The member states of the newly created Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in November 1950. The signatory states viewed the Convention as one piece 
of their collective effort “to prevent future European wars, bolster liberal democracy, oppose 
Communism, and express a common European identity, through their joint commitment to rights” 
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(Stone Sweet and Keller 2008, 5). The Convention provided for the creation of a European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), which held its first session in 1959. The Court was dramatically transformed 
by an additional protocol in 1998, which abolished the European Commission of Human Rights 
(which previously held the sole power of referral to the ECtHR), established the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court, and created the right of individual petition. The ECtHR determines 
whether a member state has violated Convention rights. Through 2016, it had issued more than 
18,000 judgments. Its jurisprudence has been progressive (Cichowski 2007; Stone Sweet and Ryan 
Forthcoming), in that it treats the Convention as a “living instrument”2 (Letsas 2013) and has been 
willing to announce higher standards of rights protection when it deems that a European 
consensus on a higher standard has emerged (and sometimes when a consensus has not yet 
developed).  
Though the Court’s judgments are, in formal terms, directed at the state that is the subject of a 
petition, they are widely seen as signaling how the Court will rule in future cases and therefore 
indicating that its case law applies to all 47 member states. In fact, there is evidence that member 
states view the Court’s jurisprudence as having these erga omnes effects (Helfer and Voeten 2014). 
The European Convention and the case law of the ECtHR have been broadly incorporated in 
domestic legal systems in Europe (Keller and Stone Sweet 2008) and the rate of compliance with 
ECtHR judgments is – again generally speaking – high (Baluarte and De Vos 2010; Hawkins and 
Jacoby 2010; Hillebrecht 2014). Thus the ECtHR’s rights-review role has been broadly effective and 
substantially integrated with national legal systems. In short, “the Convention and the Court 
perform functions that are comparable to those performed by national constitutions and 
constitutional courts in Europe” (Stone Sweet and Keller 2008, 7). Indeed, the Court has referred to 
the European Convention as “a constitutional document”3 and some scholars view the Court as a 
constitutional court for Europe (Gardbaum 2008, 760; Greer 2006, 173; Stone Sweet and Ryan 
Forthcoming).  
bb) The inter-American system 
The member states of the Organization of American States adopted the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR) in 1969, though the Convention did not receive the requisite number of 
ratifications and enter into force until 1978. The ACHR built on the 1948 American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, which was the world’s first general international human rights document. 
The Convention provided for the creation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), 
which held its first session in June 1979. Cases reach the IACtHR through a two-step process in 
which petitions go first to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which – once the 
petition is deemed admissible – seeks to bring the petitioners and the respondent state to a 
“friendly settlement.” If that effort is not successful, the Commission refers the case to the Court.4 
The IACtHR is the authoritative interpreter of the American Convention and its decisions as to 
whether a violation has occurred are final. Through 2016, the IACtHR had issued 212 judgments on 
the merits. 
                                                        
2 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Judgment (Chamber), European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 5856/72, 25 
April 1978. 
3 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Judgment (Grand Chamber), European Court of Human Rights, 
Application No. 15318/89, 23 March 1995, para. 75. 
4 Before procedural reforms in 2001, the Commission had discretion as to whether or not to submit a case that 
does not reach a friendly settlement to the Court. Since the reforms, it normally must do so. 
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Though its caseload amounts to a minute fraction of the ECtHR’s, the Inter-American Court has 
developed a dynamic jurisprudence and has sought to establish itself as the apex of a legal system 
for applying the American Convention. The Court’s most assertive effort along these lines is its 
doctrine of “conventionality control.” 5 The Court announced the doctrine in its judgment in 
Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, declaring that domestic courts were required to ensure that domestic 
legal acts conformed with the American Convention; that is, domestic courts were to exercise a 
form of judicial review for “conventionality.”6 Furthermore, domestic courts should “take into 
account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court.”7 
In a subsequent judgment, the IACtHR extended the doctrine by requiring that all state officials at 
all levels (not just judges) exercise conventionality control over all legal acts.8 The analogy to 
review for constitutionality is clear. Indeed, Dulitzky concludes that the IACtHR, with the doctrine of 
conventionality control, has sought to establish the ACHR “as an inter-American constitution” and 
itself as “an inter-American constitutional court” (Dulitzky 2015, 64). That the IACtHR has not fully 
succeeded in establishing itself as a regional constitutional court is evidenced by the resistance it 
has encountered from some domestic courts (Huneeus 2011; Contesse 2019).9 Compliance with 
IACtHR judgments is patchy and generally lower than is the case for the ECtHR (Baluarte and De Vos 
2010; Hawkins and Jacoby 2010; Hillebrecht 2014). Nevertheless, its role as the final arbiter of 
higher-order, human rights norms and its capacity to judge the compatibility of state actions vis-à-
vis Convention rights indicate that a form of regional constitutionalism is being constructed in the 
region. 
cc) The African system 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) has only recently begun to function and 
is still developing its jurisprudence and establishing its authority in the region. The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “Banjul Charter”) was adopted by the member states of the 
Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) in 1981 and entered into effect in 1986. The 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established by a protocol to the African Charter; 
the protocol was adopted in 1998 and came into force in 2004. The ACtHPR issued its first judgment 
on the merits in 2013. As of the end of 2018, it had issued 26 judgments on the merits, finding 
violations of the African Charter in 23 of those. It is therefore too early to draw conclusions about 
the Court’s jurisprudence or the extent of state compliance with its rulings. Formally, at least, the 
ACtHPR has a constitutional role in the African Union, with the authority to review state acts for 
their compatibility with the African Charter and other international human rights instruments.  
 
 
                                                        
5 The doctrine of conventionality control has been controversial and has generated an enormous quantity of 
analysis and debate. For representative assessments see Binder (2011); Dulitzky (2015); Dulitzky (2015) and the 
works cited therein. 
6 Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, Series C No. 154, 26 September 2006, para. 124. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Gelman v. Uruguay, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 20 March 
2013, para. 66-69. 
9 Though it should be noted that the ECtHR, widely seen as the most effective and influential human rights 
court in the world, also encounters resistance from some member states (Madsen 2016). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3394927 




c) Human rights law: the national level 
International and regional human rights norms have been incorporated into national legal systems 
in multiple ways, including via a constitution, legislation, or judicial interpretation. Given the 
dominance of the “new constitutionalism” in the writing of national constitutions since World War 
II, I start with the constitutionalization of international rights. The new constitutionalism emerged 
in Europe in the 1950s and featured three core elements: “(1) an entrenched, written constitution, 
(2) a charter of fundamental rights, and (3) a mode of constitutional judicial review to protect those 
rights” (Stone Sweet 2012, 816). By the 1990s, this model “had diffused globally” (Ibid.). Indeed, as 
Law and Versteeg demonstrate, “it has become standard practice for constitutions to include 
explicit rights provisions” (Law and Versteeg 2011, 1194). Not only that, but the nature of rights 
provisions displays clear trends: “a tendency to guarantee an increasing number of rights; the 
spread of judicial review; and the existence of generic rights that can reliably be found in the vast 
majority of constitutions” (Ibid.). Stone Sweet finds that all of the 106 constitutions established 
since 1985 included a charter of rights and 101 included a mechanism of judicial rights review 
(Stone Sweet 2012, 816, n. 812).  
International human rights law has had a clear and demonstrable effect on the domestic 
constitutionalization of rights. In fact, it is possible to trace domestic constitutional rights to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the first international (as opposed to regional) document to 
enumerate a comprehensive list of basic physical integrity, political, and civil rights. Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Simmons show the influence of the UDHR on constitutional rights in several ways. 
For instance, the similarity between new constitutions and the UDHR is greater after 1948 than 
before. 10 In addition, the average percentage of UDHR rights included in constitutions rises 
dramatically after 1948. Finally, analyzing constitutions written after 1948 and a total of 73 rights, 
they find that UDHR rights are more than one and one-half times as likely as non-UDHR rights (that 
is, rights not appearing in the UDHR) to be included in constitutions (Elkins, Ginsburg et al. 2013, 77, 
79, 80). Beck, Meyer, et al. report similar findings. The average number of UDHR rights included in 
national constitutions rises from about 15 in 1900, to 20 in 1948, to about 35 in 2013. They explain 
the rise in terms of the influence of world society: the larger the number of global human rights 
treaties in existence at the time of a constitution’s initial adoption, and the more of those treaties 
a country has signed, the larger the number of UDHR rights the constitution will include (Beck, 
Meyer et al. 2017, 10). Sloss and Sandholtz, employing a different coding of 68 UDHR rights, show 
that the number of UDHR rights included in national constitutions rises dramatically after 1948; see 
figure 2. The average number of UDHR rights in constitutions in 1947 was 11.5; by 2005 it reached a 
peak of 30.6 (Sloss and Sandholtz forthcoming). Finally, Versteeg has shown that the international 





                                                        
10 The point here is that though some constitutions enacted before the adoption of the UDHR (1948) 
incorporated rights that would later be included in the UDHR, the overlap between national constitutional 
rights and UDHR rights is much greater after adoption of the UDHR. 
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States can also “constitutionalize” international human rights norms without formally writing them 
into the constitution. Rights can be translated into domestic law through legislation and through 
judicial decisions. For instance, member states of the ECtHR have incorporated ECHR rights in 
domestic law through all three means (constitution, statute, jurisprudence) (Keller and Stone Sweet 
2008). Latin American states have constitutionalized international human rights treaties through 
political means (constitution-writing and legislation) as well as judicial means (Góngora Mera 2011). 
In Africa, the experience is similarly varied, but with the same overall trend. Viljoen shows that 
international human rights law (with a particular focus on the African Charter) becomes 
incorporated in domestic law via the constitution, through legislative incorporation, and through 
judicial interpretation (Viljoen 2012, chap. 12).  
Finally, just as the normative substance of global constitutionalism has diffused broadly in national 
legal orders, the institutional component – courts empowered to exercise constitutional rights 
review – has also spread transnationally. The dominant institutional form is the constitutional 
court, which holds authority to review official acts for their compliance with a rights-based 
constitution (Stone Sweet and Palmer 2017, 389, 394; Stone Sweet 2012). The Varieties of Democracy 
Project has constructed cross-national, cross-temporal data that includes an indicator of judicial 
review. A country is coded in a given year as having judicial review if “any court in the judiciary 
[has] the legal authority to invalidate governmental policies (e.g. statutes, regulations, decrees, 
administrative actions) on the grounds that they violate a constitutional provision” (Coppedge, 
Gerring et al. 2018, 152; Coppedge, Gerring et al. 2018). The V-Dem definition of judicial review thus 
corresponds with the concept advanced in work on the new constitutionalism. Figure 3 shows the 
number of countries each year that are classified as having judicial review. The number of 
countries with judicial review shows a strong upward trend, with a particularly striking acceleration 
Figure 2 
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in the 1980s and 1990s (an era of constitution writing and revision after the end of the Cold War). By 


















This section has described a global constitutionalism of human rights, which consists of 
interlocking normative structures at three levels – international, regional, and national – and 
associated institutions for rights review at two – regional and national. The global system is 
cosmopolitan in that it is grounded not in sovereign statehood or the will of a specific people but 
rather in universal rights. It is pluralist in that it embraces multiple legal orders each with 
autonomous claims to legitimacy. The next section addresses the apparently missing piece: rights 
review for the global level. 
4. An institutional framework for global rights review 
I argue in this section that an institutional framework for rights review does exist at the global 
level. It is pluralist, in the sense that it is a network of multiple judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, 
each with its own basis of legitimacy and authority. The network consists of the three regional 
human rights courts – European, Inter-American, and African – plus the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee. Two potential objections immediately present themselves. First, the regional human 
Figure 3 
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rights courts have no binding jurisdiction outside of their respective regional conventions and the 
countries that have ratified them. They are not authoritative interpreters of the global human 
rights treaties. Second, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) is not a court; its General Comments 
and its “views” on individual petitions are not binding on anybody.  
The responses are straightforward. First, the regional human rights courts see themselves as 
integral parts of a larger, global system of human rights law. They regularly invoke the global 
treaties and treaty bodies as guides in interpreting the regional human rights treaties. For those 
states and populations that live within the jurisdiction of the regional courts, those courts are in 
practice authoritative interpreters of global human rights law. Outside of those regions, the 
interpretations of the regional human rights courts are relevant considerations in determining the 
content of the global treaties, much as the interpretations of domestic courts are relevant in 
determining treaty obligations.11 Second, the HRC is an authoritative interpreter of the ICCPR. It 
thus serves as a central reference point for the regional courts and, in principle, for domestic 
courts. In other words, though the HRC does not issue binding judgments, it plays a coordinating 
role in the development of international human rights jurisprudence. 
In this section, I provide evidence to support the claim that the regional human rights courts and 
the HRC together form a global institutional framework for rights review – the institutional 
component of global rights-based constitutionalism. The evidence is the judicial dialogue, taking 
the form of cross-citations, in which they participate. I acknowledge at the outset two limitations of 
the study. First, important regions of the world do not participate directly in the loose institutional 
structure of global rights review. Asia and the Middle East region lack regional human rights courts; 
states in those regions are not under the binding jurisdiction of any supranational human rights 
court. Of course, the jurisprudence of the regional courts and the HRC is available to activists, 
advocates, and courts in those regions, if they are inclined to draw upon it. Second, the analysis 
here sets aside the domestic dimension. Domestic courts are the “front line” in applying human 
rights law and holding state officials accountable for violations. And national courts in Africa, 
Europe, and Latin America are in dialogue – to a greater or lesser extent – with their regional 
courts. But incorporating domestic courts would be a project too vast for this analysis. And, in any 
case, the central goal of this study is to assess the degree to which we can say that a global 
infrastructure for rights-review constitutionalism exists.  
a) Precedent, external citations, and the quest for legitimacy 
Courts face a permanent crisis of legitimacy because the loser in any dispute may be inclined to 
reject the court’s decision as biased, political, or arbitrary (Shapiro 1981, chap. 1). One of the most 
important tools for defusing the ongoing crisis of legitimacy is giving reasons, which means 
explaining why the court’s decision was not biased or arbitrary but was required by the law (Carter 
and Burke 2016, 8). A court’s citations to case law are a crucial part of its giving reasons and thus of 
its legitimation strategy. My premise is that courts cite other courts primarily to build or maintain 
their own legitimacy.  
                                                        
11 Though the role of domestic judgments in interpreting treaty obligations is subject to ongoing debate, its 
relevance appears to be increasingly accepted. The International Law Commission included judicial functions 
in its conclusion on “Conduct as subsequent practice” in its Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and 
Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties; see International Law Commission (2018a, 
Conclusion 5; 2018b, Chapter IV). See also the contributions in Aust and Nolte (2016). 
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Precedent, of course, does not exist in international courts and tribunals, at least as a formal 
matter. But in practice, litigants and judges in international courts routinely invoke precedent. 
International courts – like all courts – are drawn irresistibly to the use of precedent (Shapiro 1972; 
Stone Sweet 2002; Jacob 2012; von Bogdandy and Venzke 2012; von Bogdandy and Venzke 2013), for 
reasons explained in the preceding paragraph. International courts cite externally not because it is 
in any sense binding but rather as a means of enhancing legitimacy by showing that their decisions 
are not arbitrary (Voeten 2010, 553). External citations enhance legitimacy with internal 
constituencies (national governments, legislatures, courts, activists, advocates, and the public) by 
showing that the court’s reasons are sound, or that the court’s interpretation of the law is 
consistent with common practice in other jurisdictions, or that a different court would decide the 
case in the same way.  
b) The regional courts in a global system 
I argue that the regional human rights courts cite each other and the HRC for a second reason: 
because they want to be seen as active participants in the construction of the global human rights 
regime. They want to influence, and to be seen as influencing, other courts and the broader 
international regime. International judges care about their reputation and status among their 
international peers. As Voeten notes, one motive for external citations is “influencing other courts.” 
Judges who do not cite externally are less likely to be cited themselves (Voeten 2010, 550). External 
citations, then, target not just internal constituencies but also international ones. External citations 
signal to other international courts that the citing court is attuned to international jurisprudential 
currents and desires to participate in their development. 
The regional human rights courts clearly see themselves as integrated in a larger global human 
rights system. This self-conception is important because it underpins the courts’ invocation of 
global human rights treaties and it both explains and legitimizes their references to the Human 
Rights Committee. That is, if the HRC is the authoritative interpreter of one of the pillar treaties of 
the global human rights system, then it is appropriate and perhaps even necessary for the regional 
courts to draw on the HRC for interpretive guidance. 
The ECtHR explicitly places the European Convention and its own jurisprudence in the broader 
context of international human rights law. As the Court stated in Hassan v. United Kingdom, “As the 
Court has observed on many occasions, the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum and 
should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it 
forms part.”12 The Court routinely cites international human rights treaties and the interpretations 
of the human rights treaty bodies as it interprets the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Similarly, the Inter-American Court recognizes that the American Convention on Human Rights and 
the Inter-American human rights system are embedded in the larger system of international 
human rights law (Neuman 2008, 112). As one of the Court’s influential presidents, Judge Antônio 
Augusto Cançado Trindade, put it, “the regional systems of protection operate in the framework of 
the universality of human rights” (Cançado Trindade 2004, 29). The Court itself repeatedly places 
the American Convention and the Inter-American Human Rights System within the context of the 
global human rights regime. A word search of all IACtHR merits judgments in English found the 
                                                        
12 Hassan v. United Kingdom, Judgment (Grand Chamber), European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 29750/09, 
16 September 2014, para. 77. 
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phrase “international human rights law” used 474 times in 119 judgments, the phrase “international 
human rights standards” 31 times in 20 judgments, and “international human rights system” six 
times in five judgments. In these references the Court regularly affirms that regional human rights 
law is embedded in a broader system of international human rights law. In its first advisory 
opinion, for example, the IACtHR declared: 
The nature of the subject matter itself, however, militates against a strict distinction 
between universalism and regionalism. Mankind's universality and the universality of the 
rights and freedoms which are entitled to protection form the core of all international 
protective systems. In this context, it would be improper to make distinctions based on the 
regional or non-regional character of the international obligations assumed by States, and 
thus deny the existence of the common core of basic human rights standards.13 
Moreover, both the preamble to the American Convention and Art. 29 of the Convention place the 
regional treaty in an international context. Art. 29 decrees that “[n]o provision of the Convention 
may be interpreted as . . . restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized . 
. . by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party.”14 In Ituango Massacres 
v. Colombia the IACtHR declares that “[t]he corpus juris of international human rights law 
comprises a set of international instruments of varied content and juridical effects (treaties, 
conventions, resolutions and declarations). . . . This Court, therefore, must adopt the proper 
approach to consider this question in the context of the evolution of the fundamental rights of the 
individual in contemporary international law.”15 Such examples could easily be multiplied. In 
addition, the IACtHR routinely cites international human rights treaties, the interpretations of the 
human rights treaty bodies, the jurisprudence of the other regional human rights courts (especially 
the ECtHR), and international soft law sources (Neuman 2008, 109-110). 
Like the ECtHR and the IACtHR, the African Court also sees itself as part of a larger international 
human rights system. Indeed, the Protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, under “Sources of Law,” declares, “The Court shall apply the provisions of the Charter and 
any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned.”16 The African Court 
also cites routinely to international human rights treaties and treaty bodies, as well as the other 
regional human rights courts. 
c) The web of judicial exchange 
The regional courts cite each other often, with the African and Inter-American courts doing so more 
than the ECtHR. All three regularly refer to the Human Rights Committee. The Human Rights 
Committee plays a distinct role in this web of judicial exchange. The HRC is not a court and it 
possesses no binding jurisdiction. However, it is an authoritative interpreter of the ICCPR. Its 18 
members are independent experts who are elected in their personal capacity to four-year terms 
(with the possibility of reelection). The HRC announces its interpretations of the Covenant through 
                                                        
13 “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, Advisory Opinion OC-1, Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Series A No. 1, 24 September 1982, para. 40. 
14 American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, Art. 29. 
15 Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 148, 1 July 2006, para. 157, 
n. 177. 
16 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1998, Art. 7 (emphasis added). 
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three main mechanisms: (1) “concluding observations” on the reports regularly submitted by 
member states; (2) “adoption of views” in response to complaints submitted by states or (far more 
commonly) by individuals, alleging violations of the ICCPR by a state party; and (3) “general 
comments,” which the Committee offers on its own initiative as interpretations of the covenant 
with regard to specific themes or topics. The data reported below include references by the three 
regional courts to all three types of HRC communications. The data do not include citations by the 
HRC to the regional courts. The HRC does cite the jurisprudence of the regional courts, but it 
appears to do so only in delineating the procedural history of the case, that is, when the complaint 
before it has been the subject of a regional court decision. The HRC appears not to cite the regional 
courts as persuasive authority when explaining its reasons. Keller and Grover note that “[i]n 
respect of regional human rights regimes (e.g. European Court of Human Rights), the [Human 
Rights] Committee is understandably reluctant to rely on their jurisprudence, as many states 
parties may not have submitted to these regimes” (Keller and Grover 2012, 157). Conte and Burchill 
state more categorically that the HRC does not cite the regional courts: “The Committee has also 
eschewed the assistance of the jurisprudence of other international human rights bodies in 
interpreting the ICCPR” (Conte and Burchill 2016, 16). The regional human rights courts are not 
obligated to consult HRC communications, but they do. 
For the regional courts, the data reported below include only final judgments on the merits; they 
exclude separate opinions, rulings on admissibility, and advisory opinions. Because my purpose is 
to analyze the role of cross-regional citations in the development of human rights jurisprudence, 
the focus on merits judgments is appropriate.  
Figure 4 depicts the web of cross-citations in graphic form. The numbers beside the arrows indicate 
the number of cases in which a citation occurs; the arrows point to the cited body. These data are 
cumulative, covering the human rights courts from their first judgment through 2015. Figure 5 
shows the number of citations among the courts and the HRC, excluding duplications. That is, in 
preparing the data describe in figure 5, I dropped citations within each judgment that referred to 
the same external document. Clear differences among the regional courts are apparent. The newer 
human rights courts – the ACtHPR and the IACtHR – cite externally at a much higher rate than does 
the ECtHR. In fact, the IACtHR has cited the ECtHR in 75 percent of its merits judgments and the HRC 
in 36 percent. The ACtHPR has cited the other two regional courts in 75 percent of its judgments 
and the HRC in 58 percent.  
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That the ECtHR cites externally less often makes sense, given that by the time the other two courts 
were producing judgments, the ECtHR already had a large and well-developed case law of its own. 
For instance, by the year in which the IACtHR issued its first judgment on the merits (1988), the 
ECtHR had already issued 180. When the IACtHR reached 100 merits judgments (2008), the ECtHR 
had more than 10,000. The ACtHPR issued its first judgment on the merits in 2013, and through 2015 
it had produced only 12 merits judgments, by which time the ECtHR had accumulated more than 
18,000 merits judgments. In other words, the ECtHR had fewer reasons or less need to cite the 
other two regional courts (Sandholtz and Feldman 2019). Still, the ECtHR has cited both of its peer 
bodies.  
The citations to the African system require some clarification. The African human rights system 
includes two bodies (as does the Inter-American system), a commission and a court. The African 
Commission is much older than the Court, having been created by the 1981 African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and having initiated operations in 1987. It can receive petitions from 
African Union member states, from organizations, and from individuals. If the Commission finds 
that a violation of the African Charter has occurred, it can recommend measures for a friendly 
settlement. It can also refer cases to the African Court. Though the case law of the African Court is 
still sparse, the African Commission has built a body of jurisprudence, having issued a total of 97 
decisions on the merits through 2018. The data reported in the figures include ECtHR and IACtHR 
Figure 5 
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citations to the African Commission because omitting references to its decisions would create the 
misleading impression that the ECtHR and the IACtHR have paid no attention to their African 
counterparts.17  
d) The network in practice: illustrations 
It would be impossible to analyze in a single paper the substance and character of the multiple 
channels of exchange among the regional courts and HRC. Some broad observations, with 
illustrative examples, may nevertheless be useful.  
aa) The ACtHPR 
As noted above, because the ACtHPR is so new, it has not yet developed a large body of case law. 
With only 12 judgments on the merits through 2017, it is hard to generalize about the Court’s 
pattern of external citations, except to point out that it cites externally in all but one of the 12 
judgments.18 Not surprisingly, the ACtHPR routinely draws on the jurisprudence of its sister regional 
courts and on the HRC to lend support to its reasoning. It cites them on substantive norms, on due 
process norms, and on principles of interpretation. This statement captures the ACtHPR’s approach 
to external precedent: “The Court is fortified in its reasoning by the decisions of the African 
Commission, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which are courts of similar jurisdiction.”19 
In Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso, for example, the Court refers to the ECtHR, the IACtHR, and the 
HRC on the inappropriate use of criminal sanctions in defamation cases.20 In a case involving 
procedural due process, the Court referred to case law from both of the other regional courts and 
the HRC in interpreting the obligation of the state to ensure that those accused of criminal 
offenses have access to effective legal assistance.21 The ACtHPR has also adopted proportionality 
analysis as the most suitable method for determining the permissibility of state restrictions on 
qualified rights. In laying out the elements of proportionality analysis, the Court quotes from the 
ECtHR (Handyside v. United Kingdom, Gillow v. United Kingdom, and other cases) and the IACtHR 
(Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama).22 
bb) The ECtHR 
In the late 1990s many of the ECtHR’s cites to the IACtHR dealt with physical integrity rights, an area 
in which the ECtHR did not have a large body of precedent but the IACtHR did. For instance, the 
                                                        
17 The IACtHR has cited mostly the African Court but also the African Commission; the ECtHR has cited only the 
Commission. 
18 The exception is a 2017 judgment in which the Court cites only its own precedents: Christopher Jonas v. 
Tanzania, Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Application No. 011/2015, 26 September 2017. 
19 Wilfred Onyango Nganyi et al. v. Tanzania, Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Applica-
tion No. 006/2013, 18 March 2016, para. 169. 
20 Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso, Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Application No. 
004/2013, 5 December 2014. 
21 Wilfred Onyango Nganyi et al. v. Tanzania, Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Applica-
tion No. 006/2013, 18 March 2016. 
22 Tanganyika Law Society et al. v. Tanzania, Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Applica-
tion No. 009/2011 (and joined cases), 14 June 2013, para. 106. In Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso, the Court 
cites the ECtHR, the HRC, and the IACtHR on the requirements of proportionality analysis (2014). 
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ECtHR first cited the IACtHR for its jurisprudence with regard to forced disappearances. It also 
referred to IACtHR cases with respect to corporal punishment to extract confessions and to capital 
punishment (Sandholtz and Feldman 2019, 118-119). The ECtHR has occasionally cited the African 
Commission, for example on the positive duty of the state to protect from violence lawyers 
representing accused persons.23 It cited the African Commission on the point that “unremunerated 
work is tantamount to a violation of the right to respect for the dignity inherent in the human 
being.”24  
The ECtHR cites the HRC more than it does the other regional courts. For example, the ECtHR cited 
a General Comment of the HRC in support of the point that states could not invoke states of 
emergency as justification for violating peremptory norms of international law, including the 
“fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence.”25 On a due process 
norm, the ECtHR cited the HRC to the effect that the accused should have access to legal assistance 
at all stages of the proceedings, including police questioning.26 
cc) The IACtHR 
The Inter-American Court has cited the ECtHR across a wide range of topics, which is not surprising 
since it cites the European Court in three-quarters of its judgments. One important example deals 
with the obligation of states to ensure respect for convention rights. In the Cotton Fields case, the 
IACtHR cited judgments of the ECtHR in support of its finding of state responsibility for violations 
committed by private actors, and for its determination that the failure to prevent violence against 
women was part of a generalized pattern that amounted to discrimination against women.27 The 
IACtHR has also invoked ECtHR rulings to deal with newly arising rights issues, for example, 
involving sexual orientation and in vitro fertilization (Sandholtz and Feldman 2019, 115-117). Indeed, 
the IACtHR cites the ECtHR and the HRC in support of some of its most important contributions to 
the development of international human rights law.  
The IACtHR cites the African Commission and the African Court far less frequently, but it has done 
so in cases involving media rights and freedom of expression,28 the right of indigenous peoples to 
the natural resources on their traditional lands,29 and in several of its landmark amnesty cases, 
among other topics.30 
                                                        
23 Bljakaj and others v. Croatia, Judgment (First Section), European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 74448/12, 
18 September 2014. 
24 J. and others v. Austria, Judgment (Fourth Section), European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 58216/12, 17 
January 2017, para. 8, n. 77. 
25 Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, Judgment, European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 
5809/08, 21 June 2016, para. 30. 
26 Simeonovi v. Bulgaria, Judgment, European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 21980/04, 12 May 2017, para. 71. 
27 González et al. ("Cotton Field") v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 205, 16 November 2009. 
28 Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, Series C No. 107, 2 July 2004, para. 114, also citing the HRC; Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 111, 31 August 2004. 
29 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, Series C No 172, 28 November 2007, para. 120, n. 122. 
30 Gomes Lund et al. ("Guerrilha do Araguaia") v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 24 November 2010; Massacres of El Mozote v. El Salvador, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 252, 25 October 2012; Gelman v. 
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The Inter-American Court has developed innovative jurisprudence in a number of areas and in 
doing so has repeatedly drawn connections to the case law of the other regional courts and the 
HRC. For instance, beginning with its earliest decisions the IACtHR has advanced the principle that 
states are under an obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish serious violations of human 
rights. The Court has noted that both the ECtHR and the HRC have adopted similar views.31 In one of 
the core amnesty cases, the IACtHR cited the HRC on the “prohibition of amnesties that prevent the 
investigation and punishment of those who commit serious human rights crimes.”32 The IACtHR has 
emphasized the right to the truth, that is, to the truth about the fate of victims of rights violations. 
The Court has cited both the ECtHR and the HRC in establishing that right.33 In the area of 
procedural rights, the IACtHR cited both the HRC and the African Commission in support of its 
finding that even in cases involving the expulsion or deportation of foreigners, states must follow 
minimum standards of due process.34  
5. Conclusion 
The three regional courts make reference to each others’ case law and to the jurisprudence of the 
Human Rights Committee. These cross-citations serve as an informal coordinating device. Of course 
the human rights courts offer their own nuances and innovations (Sandholtz 2017). But the practice 
of cross-citation enables them to advance shared interpretations of basic international human 
rights norms and principles. That the HRC serves as a common point of reference enhances the 
degree of coordination across the regional courts. This coordination has produced common 
approaches to substantive rights, like access to justice as a human right, and the right to the truth. 
It has also generated shared methods of interpretation, notably proportionality analysis as a 
means of determining when governments are justified in impinging on qualified rights (Stone 
Sweet and Mathews 2019, chap. 6).  
Global rights-based constitutionalism requires two main components: an overarching normative 
structure and an institutional means for interpreting and applying international human rights 
norms. The first – the normative structure – consists of the interlocking bodies of human rights law 
at national, regional, and international levels. I have argued that the regional human rights courts 
and the HRC are constructing, in a decentralized and practice-driven way, the second component, 
an emergent institutional framework for applying and interpreting human rights norms. These 
trans-judicial dialogues create a degree of coherence among distinct human rights systems, each 
with its own political context and basis of authority. Of course, coordination will not be complete 
and divergences will remain, given the differing challenges and demands placed on the different 
systems. By the same token, because the network is decentralized and informal, it remains open to 
new potential entrants, should regional institutions develop in parts of the world where they do 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Uruguay, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 20 March 2013. See 
also Sandholtz and Rangel Padilla (forthcoming). 
31 Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 
153, 22 September 2006, para. 83. 
32 Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 221, 24 
February 2011, para. 205, 206. 
33 “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Merits, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series 
C No. 63, 19 November 1999, para. 176, n. 31. 
34 Pacheco Tineo Family v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, Series C No. 272, 25 November 2013, para. 132, n. 157. 
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not yet exist. And the jurisprudence being developed by this international network is also 
accessible to activists, advocates, and judges at the national and sub-national levels. To the extent 
that international judicial dialogue serves as an informal mechanism for coordinating the 
interpretation and development of human rights norms, it strengthens the international rule of 
law. 
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